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DOES THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT ALLOW PRIVATE EQUITY
GROUPS TO ENTER INTO COMPLEX
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH
BRAZILIAN COMPANIES?
Cinthia Daniela Bertan Ribeiro *
ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether Private Equity (PE) and Venture Capital
(VC) groups (jointly called PE-VCs) can and do enter into complex con-
tractual arrangements with Brazilian companies. This is done first by
identifying the financial contracting structures used in both developed
and developing countries. This paper will then review Brazilian legisla-
tion for securities and corporate control, cash flow, and control rights
used by PE-VCs in stock-purchase shareholders agreements with Brazil-
ian companies, and structures employed in Brazil compared to PE-VC
contracting choices in other countries. Both the influence of enforcement
in contracting choices and recent developments in the Brazilian legal en-
vironment are also examined to provide a full picture of investment con-
ditions in Brazil. Literature presents evidence that developing countries
with French civil law origin, such as Brazil, have the worst environment
for PE-VC investment. But interviews with PE-VCs operating in Brazil
reveal that some of the main rights found in the United States and other
developed countries are also found in local financial contracts. For exam-
ple, convertible securities have been significantly used and minority posi-
tions with contingencies have been frequent. Economic stability and
sustained growth in the past four years, added to the capital markets de-
velopment, PE-VCs' experience growth in the country, institutionaliza-
tion of arbitration, and other improvements in the legal framework are
likely to have fostered the use of complex contractual structures in Brazil.
On the other hand, deficiencies in the court system in Brazil remain a
severe drawback. Some PE-VCs still require full control and rely on
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common stocks, which is a typical characteristic of low enforcement
countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE main objective of this paper is to determine whether investors
can and do enter into complex contractual arrangements with pri-
vately-held Brazilian companies. The more sophisticated the con-
tractual structures adopted in investment transactions in a given country,
the more investors depend on the set of contractually established rules.
Consequently, more parties rely on the country's regulatory framework
and legal enforcement.1 Therefore, the systematic use of complex finan-
cial contracts could be a good indicator of the quality of a country's insti-
tutional environment. A second goal is to understand whether the recent
changes in Brazil's regulatory environment have encouraged investment
in privately-held companies.
This review starts with an analysis of recent literature showing the dif-
ferences in contractual structures across countries. Scholars present evi-
dence that financial contracting is influenced by the legal regime,
enforcement efficiency, and other institutional features. This means that
an investor willing to purchase stocks in privately-held companies with
similar operations, but located in different regions, would likely adopt
different contractual structures in each country in order to fit in local
legal requirements, avoid risks of non-enforcement, and adapt to local
economic conditions.
Then the contractual relationship between private fund providers and
Brazilian privately-held companies will be examined. This investigation
is conducted through the analysis of PE and VC groups' transactions due
to their representativeness and PE-VCs' distinctive technique of allocat-
ing cash flow and control rights separately, which allows comparing their
contractual choices across different environments.
The core focus of this paper is on provisions related to three sensitive
areas for investment: cash flow rights, control rights, and enforceability of
contracts. The typical structures used between PE-VCs and privately-
held companies in Brazil will be identified and compared with the ones
used in high and low enforcement countries. 2 If the structures used more
1. According to La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny's and Lerner and Schoar's
findings, the legal environment significantly impacts financial contracting. See
Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131,
1149 (1997); Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect
Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity, 120 Q. J.
ECON. 223, 224 (2005). For a contrasting view, see Steven Kaplan & Per
Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts (Center for Research in Security Prices,
Working Paper No. 513, 2000).
2. See Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Transaction Structures in the Developing
World: Evidence from Private Equity 12-13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10348, 2004).
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closely resemble those used in high enforcement countries, it may indi-
cate developed regulations and a higher investor perception of protection
and contract enforceability. Conversely, if the structures utilized are
more similar to the low enforcement developing countries, it may suggest
deficiencies within the legal environment.
The findings of this paper are a result of the analysis of previous empir-
ical studies conducted by researchers in Brazil and other countries. Also,
interviews were conducted with seven PE and VC practitioners of funds
operating in Brazil-representing over ten percent 3 of the total groups ac-
tively pursuing transactions in the country, as well as legal advisors and
scholars involved with the PE-VC industry in Brazil. The questionnaire
sent to the seven groups investigated the frequency with which the funds
included certain provisions related to cash flow, control rights, and dis-
pute resolution methods in their contracts, and the reasons for choosing,
or not choosing a number of suggested contractual structures. From the
seven funds interviewed, six are based in Brazil, but most are comprised
by foreign investors, and one is based in the United States. Four of the
firms could be classified as traditional PE funds, and three as VC funds.
The funds' answers were based on a sample of 112 transactions, most of
them closed within the last four years (Table 1).
TABLE 1 - PE-VC GROUPS INTERVIEWED
Fund Type # of Period
transactions (years)
A PE 4 5
B VC 16 4
C VC 25 4
D VC 50 1
E PE 9 8
F PE 3 4
G PE 5 4
Total 112 4
It is important to note that the focus that VC funds have on early stage
companies, in contrast to PE funds' focus on more mature companies,
often implicate different contractual structures. VC funds tend to dedi-
cate more efforts to structuring incentives to management given the
higher risks associated with the success of a new venture. In turn, PEs
are likely to be more concerned with the conduction of a detailed due
diligence and draft of an extensive list of representations and warranties
3. See ANTONIO G. DE CARVALHO ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL
IN BRAZIL: THE FIRST CENSUS 2, 26 (2005). Their study identified sixty-three do-
mestic and international PE and VC organizations with offices in Brazil in Decem-
ber 2004 and with intention to continue operations in the country (this number
excludes the funds that planned to end operations in Brazil).
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in order to avoid the risks associated with contingencies and unknown
liabilities of a long existing company. 4 Despite this inherent difference,
VC and PE funds were analyzed as one single class in this paper because
the objective is to understand the contractual sophistication of the main
players of private funding in Brazil, and not to enhance the particularities
of each type of venture. 5
The paper proceeds as follows: section two briefly reviews the main
literature relevant to the research topic. Sections three and four analyze
and compare the structuring of cash flow and control rights in Brazil and
other countries. Section five analyzes the influence enforcement effi-
ciency exerts on contracting choices and examines the dispute resolution
method used by PE-VCs in Brazil. Section six briefly analyzes recent
developments in the Brazilian regulatory framework relevant to PE-VC
investment. And finally, conclusions are included in section seven.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
A. LITERATURE ON PE OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING
PE-VC stock-purchase and shareholders agreements with invested
companies are extensively studied. The literature shows that PE-VCs are
likely to employ a typical set of provisions related to cash flow, control,
and liquidation rights, which normally consists of convertible preferred
stocks and contingencies. These are deemed to represent optimal con-
tracting by many U.S. scholars in the finance and legal areas. 6 In their
view, the closer a contract is to the U.S. standard the better the legal
environment in a third country is likely to be.
Diverging from most of the U.S. literature, Gilson and Schizer 7 and
Cumming8 argue that the convertible preferred structure may not always
be the optimal contracting choice in VC finance. They demonstrate that
it is possible to use different instruments to achieve similar results and
justify that the convertible preferred stocks' frequent use in the United
States is due to a tax bias.9 Likewise, referring to substantial literature on
4. JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY AND EN-
TREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 4-64 (2006).
5. The literature also conducts joint analysis of VC and PE investments. See Lerner
& Schoar, Transaction Structures in the Developing World: Evidence from Private
Equity, supra note 2, at 12. When comparing their work based on a PE sample
with Kaplan and Stromberg's one on VCs, they noted that legal texts suggest they
would have observed similar patterns if they had examined only PE transactions.
6. See Steven Kaplan et al., How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial
Contracts? 8, 21-23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10097,
2003). In their study, which encompasses primarily developed countries, they
found that convertible preferred is the most used security in the United States as
well as in the other twenty-two countries surveyed.
7. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 876-78
(2003).
8. Douglas Cumming, Capital Structure in Venture Finance, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 550, 550-
85 (2005).
9. Gilson & Schizer, supra note 7, at 876-78.
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capital structure choices and based on empirical evidence from a sample
of 3,083 Canadian VC transactions, Cumming demonstrates that the opti-
mal financing structure depends on the agency problems that may arise
from a particular deal; and therefore, investors should seek a mix of fi-
nancing instruments in order to minimize these costs.1 0
B. DETERMINANTS OF PE-VC CONTRACTING CHOICES
ACROSS COUNTRIES
Comparative studies about contracting choices related to the allocation
of cash flow, control, and liquidation rights in financial contracts abound.
Kaplan and Stromberg, 1 Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg,' 2 Lerner and
Schoar,1 3 and Cumming 14 analyze the different contracting choices across
countries and correlate them to factors such as a country's legal origin,
stage of economic development, rule of law, quality of legal enforcement,
and sophistication of the parties involved in the structuring of the
transaction.
La Porta et al. are the first to demonstrate the impact of the origin of
laws on private contractual relationships. Through their analysis of forty-
nine countries, including Brazil, they show strong evidence that the legal
regime significantly influences investor protection laws, enforcement, and
ownership concentration. 15 The poorest investor protection laws and
lowest quality of enforcement are found in French civil law countries-one
of which is Brazil-while the most protective laws and most efficient en-
forcement are in common law countries. 16
Later research by Lerner and Schoar 17 confirms the above findings.
From an analysis of 210 PE transactions in developing countries, they ex-
tract that common law developing countries, as opposed to civil law ones,
are likely to have better enforcement and contracts similar to the United
States. The authors suggest that "the contractual channel," which is "the
ability of investors to enter into complex, state-dependent contracts"'18 is
heavily impacted by the quality of a country's enforcement. 19
10. Cumming, supra note 8, at 550-54.
11. Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 1, at 1.
12. Kaplan et al., supra note 6.
13. See generally Lerner & Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transac-
tions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity, supra note 1; Lerner & Schoar,
Transaction Structures in the Developing World: Evidence from Private Equity,
supra note 2.
14. See Douglas Cumming et al., Legality and Venture Governance Around the World,
(Center for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 2004/17, 2004) (last revised Apr. 11,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=537243 (last visited Aug. 28, 2006);
Cumming, supra note 8, 550-554.
15. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1132 (1998).
16. Id. at 1114-18.
17. Lerner & Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The
Contractual Channel in Private Equity, supra note 1, at 224-25.
18. Id. at 224.
19. Id.
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In addition, contemporaneous work by Kaplan and Stromberg ad-
vances a new argument to explain different contractual choices other
than the ones related to differences in a country's institutional environ-
ment. The authors suggest that funds are more likely to use U.S. style
contract terms as their size, age, and experience with the U.S. increases,
and that some funds implement U.S. contractual features across all the
institutional environments that they invest in.20 They argue that the more
sophisticated the fund, the more likely it is to implement U.S. style
clauses, regardless of the country's legal environment.2 1
C. RELEVANT LITERATURE IN BRAZIL
When contrasted with the U.S. literature, Brazilian literature on the
local PE and VC industry and contracting choices is scarce. Research
about PE-VC investment in Brazil dates back to 2001 with Checa, Leme
and Schreier,2 2 and started to flourish in 2005 with Mariz and Savoia,2 3
Ribeiro,2 4 Carvalho, Ribeiro and Furtado,25 and Rechtman and Brito.2 6
The very recent research interest in the topic can be explained by the
history of the PE-VC industry in the country. Equity investment in Bra-
zilian private companies started in the 1970s through the National Eco-
nomic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and Brasilpar, but it
remained very restricted until the mid-1990s. 27 Actually, the first cycle of
PE-VC investment started only in 1994, the same year the Brazilian ver-
sion of the U.S. limited partnership structure was created, and ended in
2004.28 This strategic period in the PE-VC history in Brazil and the re-
cent local boom in PE-VC funding2 9 are likely to have generated the re-
search interest. Still, none of these papers focus on contractual issues of
PE-VC investment. Rather, they provide a general perspective of the
PE-VC industry in Brazil, which includes highlights on the legal environ-
ment. More relevant for the objectives of this paper are the findings from
Carvalho, Ribeiro and Furtado's survey, who obtained responses from all
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Gonzalo Checa et al., The Venture Capital and Private Equity Industry in Bra-
zil, 4 J. PRIVATE EQuITy 46, 46-67 (2001).
23. See Frederic de Mariz & Jose Roberto Ferreira Savoia, Private Equity in Brazil: A
Comparative Perspective, 9 J. PRIVATE EQuITY 74, 74-87 (2005).
24. Leonardo de Lima Ribeiro, 0 Modelo Brasileiro de Private Equity e Venture Cap-
ital (2005) (unpublished thesis, on file with the Universidade Estadual de Sao
Paulo).
25. CARVALHO ET AL., supra note 3.
26. See MARCOs RECHTMAN & BRUNO BRITO, BRICS AND PRIVATE Eouirv (2005).
27. See Checa et al., supra note 22, at 48-49.
28. CARVALHO ET AL., supra note 3, at 25. According to their survey, approximately
80 percent of the funds in Brazil have been operating for less than nine years.
29. In 2004, according to the Latin American VC Association, PE funds increased $1
billion to invest in Latin America, and Brazil is considered to have the most devel-
oped PE industry in the region. See John Barham, An Awkward Renaissance: The
Private Equity Industry is Undergoing a Rebirth Around the World, but Latin
America Might not Benefit from Boom Times in the Business, 173 LATIN FIN. 37,
37-39 (2005).
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the PE and VC organizations active in the country. 30 They presented
some interesting findings related to control rights, which will be analyzed
in section four below.
III. CASH FLOW RIGHTS
A firm can obtain external financing though debt or equity. Unlike the
debt-friendly environment found in the United States, the high cost of
capital in Brazil31 does not allow many companies, especially small and
mid-sized ones, to grow substantially through bank debt. For these firms
PE-VC investment may be more attractive because the returns on most
of the capital provided depend on the company's performance, as op-
posed to financing from banks, where payments have to be made even if
the company is short of cash.32 Although PE-VCs often provide capital
by holding a combination of debt and equity securities, they are in es-
sence interested in the upside potential provided by an equity partner-
ship. Equity investments are often made through common, preferred,
and convertible preferred stocks, as well as debt through debentures or
loans (straight debt). Even debt or debt-like structures such as non-con-
vertible debentures and non-convertible preferred stocks are often at-
tached to warrants to purchase common stocks.33
A. THE OPTIMAL FINANCING STRUCTURE: CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED
STOCKS AND SIMILAR STRUCTURES
From all the above mentioned types of securities, convertible preferred
stock is by in large the most used one in the United States.34 Theoretical
work justifies that convertible preferred stocks are superior over other
securities because they provide their holder with (1) preference in liqui-
dation, (2) dividends preference, and (3) they allow the separation of con-
trol and cash flow rights. 35 Additionally, convertibles are typically
accompanied by a series of contingencies that may impact cash flows,
such as vesting, earn-out, and anti-dilution provisions. 36 This combina-
tion of rights is considered optimal for PE-VC investments because it mit-
igates agency costs, reduces risks to the PE-VC, and creates incentives to
30. CARVALHO ET AL., supra note 3, at 26.
31. Brazil has one of the highest costs of capital in the world. The SELIC rate (official
short term rate) reached 26 percent in 2003, and in April 2007 was at 12.75 percent,
one of its lowest values in the past years, but still very high for international stan-
dards. World Interest Rates Table, http://www.fxstreet.com/fundamental/interest-
rates-table/ (last visited on April 15, 2007)
32. This does not mean though that PE financing is cheaper than a bank loan. As
Levin reminds, if the business is very successful the founder will probably end up
paying more than if it had borrowed from a bank. LEVIN, supra note 4, at 1-6.
33. Id. at 1-4.
34. According to evidence from Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 8.
35. See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 7, at 882-86; see also William A. Sahlman, The
Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473,
504 (1990).
36. Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 8.
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the entrepreneur. 37
First, the right of preference in liquidation gives its holders a prefer-
ence in relation to common stockholders. But the holders of preferred
stock are still behind all debt creditors in the liquidation line. So this
preference may not mean much if the objective is protection in the case
of bankruptcy, since upon this event assets are often not enough even to
pay creditors. But it may be more relevant if the liquidation preference is
triggered by other events, such as a sale or merger-where the preference
may result in higher payments to the PE-VC38-or the failure to reach
certain milestones, which would allow the PE-VC to redeem its participa-
tion in the company.
Second, the preference in distribution of dividends means that pre-
ferred shareholders should receive their dividends before common share-
holders. But if common shareholders decide not to distribute dividends,
nothing will be received by preferred owners unless stocks are structured
as cumulative.39 The latter guarantees the PE-VC a return, which brings
a cumulative preferred stock closer to the concept of a debt security. But
the PE-VCs' goal is not to receive fixed monthly payments; rather they
are interested in the upside potential provided by the stocks. Actually,
many times it makes more sense to reinvest the profits in the business
than to distribute them. Therefore, the dividend preference is ultimately
a way of minimizing the downside risks.
Third, the separation of cash flow and control rights is considered the
most relevant feature of convertible preferred stock because it allows for
the alignment of incentives between the PE and the entrepreneur, reduc-
ing the risks associated with uncertainty, information asymmetries, and
agency problems.40 Control can shift depending on performance, and en-
trepreneurs also appreciate not having their stocks so diluted as if the PE-
VC were purchasing straight common stocks.41 In practice, this enables a
minority shareholder PE-VC to take control of the invested company if
management does not reach certain goals, 42 or a structure may be created
37. Gilson & Schizer, supra note 7, at 875-76.
38. Gilson & Schizer illustrate this event,
[Aissume that venture capitalists invest $1 million in a firm for 10,000
shares of convertible preferred, which would represent 50% of the com-
mon stock upon conversion, while managers pay $10,000 for 10,000
shares of common. If the firm is ultimately sold for $1.3 million, the
venture capitalists would not convert; instead, they would collect their $1
million liquidation preference, while common shareholders would re-
ceive $300,000.
Id. at 884.
39. Id. at 882.
40. Id. at 879. The authors explain that uncertainty is related to unpredictable contin-
gencies and information asymmetry is about one party knowing more about cer-
tain aspects and facts of a business than the other party. Agency problems refer to
conflicting interests between the management and the shareholders.
41. Cumming et al., supra note 14, at 2.
42. Lerner & Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The
Contractual Channel in Private Equity, supra note 1, at 226.
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whereby a shareholder is entitled to 20 percent of a firm's dividends but
has the majority of seats on the board.
Empirical work shows that convertible preferred stocks have been used
significantly across the world, but still far less frequently than in the
United States. Kaplan et al. analyzed VC investments in developed coun-
tries. Their study results show that while convertible preferred stock is
the most utilized security by VCs located both in the United States as
well as in the other twenty-two countries surveyed, the frequency of its
use differs quite a lot.43 For example, the rate of frequency in the United
States is 95 percent, contrasted with a 54 percent frequency rate in other
developed countries. 44 The study also shows that outside the United
States there is relevant use of senior common stock (14.5 percent), which
is close to the concept of the convertibles in the sense that it has a liquida-
tion preference. 45 In contrast, common stocks are used in 28 percent of
transactions outside the United States and in fewer than 1 percent in the
United States.46 What could be the reasons for such a difference, espe-
cially considering the scholars targeted a quite homogeneous group?
In fact, the features of convertible preferred stocks can be replicated
for common stocks.47 For instance, it is possible to create different clas-
ses of common stock from which different rights derive, and holders of
one class can have liquidation rights, dividend preference, or more voting
rights than the other class. If such alternatives exist, how can the ubiquity
of convertible preferred stocks in the United States be explained? With
this question in mind, Gilson and Schizer found a plausible explanation;
these securities are subject to reduced taxation in the United States.48
Kaplan et al.'s and Cumming's research corroborates this finding.49
Cumming analyzed a sample of 3,083 transactions between U.S. VCs and
Canadian firms and found that convertible preferred stocks are not used
as often in transactions in Canada, where the tax incentive does not
exist. 50
These studies demonstrate that local institutional factors, such as taxes,
security costs, and the likelihood of local enforcement, must be taken into
account when designing a financial contract. What is optimal in one
country may not be so in another jurisdiction. There are many practical
examples of unsuccessful transplantation of products from one country to
another. To illustrate the potential dimensions of the problem, we can
recall what happened during the first wave of high-yield bonds (junk
bonds) in Europe in the mid-1990s. Lawyers and bankers did not adapt
43. Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 8-9.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.; Cumming et al., supra note 14, at 2-3.
48. According to Gilson and Schizer's research, managers and entrepreneurs are bene-
fited with a tax deferral and a preferential tax rate on incentive compensation. See
Gilson & Schizer, supra note 7, at 876.
49. See Cumming et al., supra note 14, at 2.
50. Id.
364 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 13
the U.S. style high-yield bonds to the environment in Europe. 51 Trans-
plantation proved to be a disaster, with bondholders of European bank-
rupt companies being left in a very weak position compared to U.S. high-
yield bondholders in the same situation.52 The reason for this was related
to particularities in the European economic and legal environments,
which did not provide investors the important protections found in U.S.
legislation.53
Nevertheless, evidence indicates that issues related to transplantation
have indeed been considered by PE-VCs. Concerning transactions in
higher-income European countries, empirical work suggests that the
more experienced U.S.- and U.K.-based PE groups are, the more likely
the groups are to use convertible preferred stocks across countries that
have provisions very similar to the ones in their home countries.54 As for
developing countries, although PEs based in the United States and the
United Kingdom tend to use preferred securities, the PEs have to make
several adjustments to adapt transactions to local conditions. 55
Therefore, despite the substitutability of convertible preferred stocks
for other structures and the dangers of transplantation, the large use of
convertible preferred stocks across countries and the advantages of this
technique for financial contracts are evident. Actually, because of its
complexity and high dependency on contractual provisions, the converti-
ble preferred structure would not be suitable in a low enforcement envi-
ronment. Thus, its use in a relevant scale in a given jurisdiction can be a
good indicator of the quality of a country's legal environment.
In this sense, when analyzing PE transactions in developing countries,
Lerner and Schoar found that on average, 54 percent of the transactions
used common stock and 21 percent used convertible preferred stock. 56
These averages are much lower percentages than those observed in devel-
oped countries.57 Within this sample they also found that in countries
with greater contractual protections, investors use more convertible pre-
ferred stock, and use less common stock and straight debt. 58 On the con-
51. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Junk Culture, THE AM. LAW. ON THE WEB, June 1,
2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1150448714123 (last vis-
ited August 29, 2006).
52. Id.
53. Id. Goldhaber points out that in the United States junk bond investors had the
protection of Chapter 11, which provided debtors with the automatic stays of as-
sets to prevent action from senior creditors. Also, European investors faced
problems related to the subordination of the credit in the operating company (usu-
ally bonds are issued through an affiliate, and not through the operating company).
The result was that while in the United States investors would typically recover
forty-five cents on the dollar, in Europe the average would go down to twenty
cents.
54. Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 21.
55. Lerner & Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The
Contractual Channel in Private Equity, supra note 1, at 27.
56. Lerner and Schoar, Transaction Structures in the Developing World: Evidence from
Private Equity, supra note 2, at 12.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 27.
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trary, in nations with fewer protections, normally the ones with French
civil law origin, PEs tend to rely on common stock and straight debt and
to own the majority of the equity. 59
B. CASH FLOW RIGHTS IN BRAZIL
The aforementioned findings elicit inquiry about the legal environment
for financial contracting in Brazil. The first question is whether legisla-
tion allows for the creation of the cash flow rights techniques discussed
above. The second question is whether or not these structures are signifi-
cantly used by PE-VCs. If the creation of these techniques are allowed
by law but not used in practice, this may mean local institutional deficien-
cies exist.
1. Brazilian Legislation
When it comes to investments in privately-held companies, there are
no significant legal restrictions on the use of any type of security, or on
the use of provisions related to contingencies and control rights. Accord-
ing to Law 6404/76, companies may issue common (article 15) or pre-
ferred (article 15 and 17) stocks, warrants (article 75), debentures (article
52), convertible preferred stocks (article 22) or convertible debentures
(article 57).60 The Law also explicitly allows the creation of shares with
different classes,6 1 where different rights can be conferred to each class.
Convertible preferred stocks of privately-held companies 62 can also be
structured in a variety of ways, making it possible to adopt the features
ordinarily used by PE-VCs in the United States. The Law only states that
preferred stocks must have some preferential right in relation to common
stocks, be it in the distribution of dividends or a priority claim in the
event of liquidation. 63 Like those in the United States,64 owners of pre-
ferred stocks in Brazil can enjoy voting rights65 as well as fixed and cumu-
lative dividends. 66 But there is a statutory limit on the number of
preferred stocks that can exist without voting rights, or with restrictions
59. Id.
60. See Lei Das Sociedades Anonimas, Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976,
D.O.U. de 1.12.1976. (Brazil) (Business Corporation Act) [hereinafter Lei No.
6404/76].
61. See Lei No. 6404/76 at art. 15, para. 1.
62. If the company is public, there are further requirements to be followed. See, e.g.,
id. at art. 17, para. 1.
63. Id.
64. See Joseph W. Bartlett & Kevin R. Garlitz, Fiduciary Duties in Burnout!
Cramdown Financings, 20 J. CoRP. L. 593, 594 (1995).
65. See Lei No. 6404/76 at art. 17, para. 1, art. 18.
66. Traditionally publicly traded preferred stocks in Brazil have no voting rights, ex-
cept in some specific situations (Lei No. 6404/76 at art.17), and owners of the
stocks are not legally entitled to any fixed or cumulative payments. This explains
the negative image commonly associated with this type of security in the public
capital markets. So it is that Novo Mercado (a listing section at BOVESPA with
higher corporate governance standards) has banned the use of preferred stocks.
Before going for an IPO, companies must liquidate all preferred stocks or convert
them into common stock. But when it comes to private contracting, preferred
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to voting rights, which cannot exceed 50 percent of the total number of a
company's stocks. 67
In general, the Brazilian corporate legislation 68 establishes only mini-
mum standards for the parties and provides private contracting with a
fairly large degree of flexibility, allowing the local replication of most of
the structures used in the United States. Even in situations where there is
no equivalent legal mechanism in the Brazilian law, which is the case with
escrow accounts, 69 private parties can adapt to existing structures and
create figures similar to the ones available in the United States.
2. PE-VC Contracting Choices on Cash Flow Rights in Brazil
The next issue is whether convertible preferred stocks or similar instru-
ments are, in practice, included in contracts with Brazilian companies.
According to the interviews, from a sample of 112 transactions, approxi-
mately 46 percent used common stocks, 50 percent convertible preferred
stocks, and 24 percent convertible debentures. 70 But if we remove from
the sample the deals of the three VC groups, which represent approxi-
mately 80 percent of the deals in the sample, the share of common stocks
rises to 79 percent, and the shares of convertible preferred stocks and
convertible debentures drop to 24 percent and 16 percent, respectively.
From another perspective, by examining the frequency with which the
different types of securities are used by each PE-VC group (Table 2)-re-
gardless of the number of transactions closed-it can also be verified that
many more PE-VCs are likely to employ common stocks instead of
convertibles. 71
First, these findings suggest the existence of significantly different fi-
nancing patterns between PE and VC groups operating in Brazil, which
contrasts with evidence in the United States. 72 Second, as Table 3 shows,
if all responses are considered, from both VCs and PEs, contracts in Bra-
stocks can adopt the features used in the United States, since Brazilian corporate
law just sets minimum advantages for preferred shares.
67. See Lei No. 6404/76 at art. 15, para. 2.
68. Lei No. 6404/76 brings the most relevant rules related to cash flow, control, and
liquidation rights.
69. Escrow accounts are widely used by investors in the United States as a way of
protecting their capital from contingencies in the invested firm.
70. The percentages are an approximation. Our questionnaire asked practitioners
about the frequency of use of each security in the total number of transactions
closed. Possible answers were always 100 percent, usually 100 percent to 70 per-
cent, often 70 percent to 50 percent, sometimes 50 percent to 15 percent, or never
0 percent. We then calculated the average for each response. For example, if a
fund said common stocks were often used in a total of ten transactions, we would
then multiply ten transactions times 60 percent (the arithmetic average of 70 per-
cent and 50 percent).
71. But some funds claim to normally use a mix of financing instruments in each trans-
action. This mix may consist of a combination of common stocks and convertible
preferred stocks; common stocks, preferred stocks (or debentures) with or without
warrants; and common stocks and straight debt. Additionally, most funds declared
they sometimes structure the agreements with different classes of common stocks.
72. See Lerner & Schoar, Transaction Structures in the Developing World: Evidence
from Private Equity, supra note 2.
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zil seem to follow European patterns.73 On the other hand, if VC trans-
actions are disregarded (Table 3), and also as a qualitative analysis
indicates (Table 2), Brazil is closer to the average in developing countries.
These results do not lead to accurate conclusions. Data from a larger
number of PE-VC organizations would have to be gathered in order to
create a more exact assessment.
Still, it can be extracted that there has been a significant use of sophisti-
cated financing instruments in contracts with Brazilian companies. Its
condition as a developing civil law country should place Brazil among the
lowest enforcement environments, however, the use of convertibles in
Brazil is above the average found in developing countries even in the
worst-case scenario (without VC transactions). On the other hand, the
predominant use of common stocks (Table 2) may mean some PE-VCs
are still cautious about relying on contract contingencies in Brazil or this
may indicate a lack of sophistication of some groups. In order to substan-
tiate and better assess these findings this review proceeds in the following
section with an analysis of control rights and contract contingencies.
TABLE 2 - FREQUENCY WITH WHICH EACH PE-VC USES
EACH TYPE OF SECURITY IN THEIR AGREEMENTS WITH
BRAZILIAN COMPANIES
Type of security Always Usually Often Sometimes Rarely Never Total
100% 100%<70% 70%<50% 50%<15% 15%<0% 0%
Common stocks 3 1 1 1 0 1 7
43% 14% 14% 14% 0% 14%
Common stocks with 0 0 0 4 0 3 7
different classes
0% 0% 0% 57% 0% 43%
Preferred stocks 0 1 0 2 1 3 7
0% 14% 0% 29% 14% 43%
Convertible preferred 1 1 0 1 1 3 7
stocks
14% 14% 0% 14% 14% 43%
Straight debt 0 0 0 2 0 5 7
0% 0% 0% 29% 0% 71%
Convertible 0 0 1 2 2 2 7
debentures
0% 0% 14% 29% 29% 29%
Warrants 0 1 1 0 1 4 7
0% 14% 14% 0% 14% 57%
Finally, the interviews revealed a lack of debt culture in the Brazilian
PE-VC industry. Five groups declared they never use straight debt and
73. Kaplan's findings on convertible preferred stocks 54 percent focus on VCs, al-
lowing comparison with our sample including VC transactions 50 percent. See Gil-
son & Schizer, supra note 7; see also Cumming et al., supra note 14, at 2.
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TABLE 3 - PERCENTAGE OF PE-VC TRANSACTIONS WHICH
USED COMMON AND CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCKS
Brazil Developing
Brazil (interviews U.S. Europe Countries (Lerner
(interviews) without VCs) (Kaplan et al.) (Kaplan et al.) and Schoar)
Common 46% 79% 1% 28% 54%
Stocks
Convertible 50% 24% 95% 54% 21%
Preferred
Stocks
the remaining two use it only sometimes. This represents only 3 percent
of the transactions from the sample. PE-VC fund managers argue that
they are interested in the upside possibilities provided by equity securi-
ties; therefore, straight debt is used only when necessary to complete a
transaction. Another explanation is related to the high cost of capital in
Brazil.
IV. CONTROL RIGHTS
A. KEY PROVISIONS RELATED TO CONTROL RIGHTS
A minority ownership implies greater dependence on contractual pro-
visions and therefore a greater reliance on a country's enforcement sys-
tem. Fundamental among a number of provisions that aim at ensuring
minority shareholder protection are anti-dilution, tag-along, and
supermajority provisions. Investors can have their preferred stocks di-
luted by a number of corporate events, such as a later issuance of stock at
a price lower than the original one paid by the investor, stock dividends,
and splits. 74 Anti-dilution clauses protect investors against the dilution of
their participation in a company by (1) making adjustments on the con-
version price of convertibles and preferred stock 75 and (2) by providing
them with preemptive rights.76 Tag-along clauses give minority share-
holders the right to sell their stock for the same price and conditions of-
fered to the majority block.77  Supermajority provisions provide
protection by requiring the approval of a corporate action by more than a
majority of the shareholders. Examples of actions requiring a
74. For a detailed study on anti-dilution provisions, see Michael A. Woronoff &
Jonathan A. Rosen, Understanding Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securi-
ties, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 130-56 (2005). Through a variety of examples, the
authors demonstrate the economic significance and complexity of anti-dilution
provisions.
75. Id.
76. Preemptive rights provide the party with the right to purchase his pro rata share in
a subsequent issuance of stocks, so he can maintain his original participation in the
company. See Eugene Kim, Comment, Venture Capital Contracting Under the Ko-
rean Commercial Code: Adopting U.S. Techniques in South Korean Transactions,
13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 439, 457-58 (2004).
77. VC Experts, Tag-Along Rights and Rights of Co-sale, http://vcexperts.com/vce/li-
brary/encyclopedia/glossary-view.asp?glossary-id=137 (last visited July 10, 2006).
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supermajority approval are recapitalization, issuance of debt or stocks,
investments above a certain threshold amount, and corporate reorganiza-
tions such as mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs. Other provisions re-
lated to the protection of the investment that are often found in U.S.
contracts are vesting and earn-out provisions, rights of first offer and first
refusal, and put and call options.
Founder vesting and earn-out provisions play the dual role of protect-
ing the investors and creating incentives to management. These clauses
are protective because PE-VCs ensure they will have at least a larger
percentage of the company's shares in case the firm underperforms or if
key professionals leave the company. From another perspective, these
clauses pose a great incentive to management; the better the performance
of the company and the longer the manager stays with the company, the
more shares he or she will be entitled to. Such provisions are particularly
important for VCs who invest in start-up companies where the success of
the business is highly dependent on the founders' presence and perform-
ance. A vesting provision can be linked to time and/or performance and
its implementation is normally done through the grant of an option to the
PE-VC to repurchase at cost-or at the lower of cost or fair value-the
shares that have not been vested. 78
When valuing the business, founders and PE-VCs usually find signifi-
cantly different numbers, even if both rely on the same historical data.
The reason for this is generally related to the company's growth potential,
unassailably bright for the founders, but nebulous for the PE-VC.
Growth assumptions used by the founder are likely to be more optimistic
then the ones adopted by the PE-VC. Earn-out provisions are typically
used to overcome these different valuation perceptions. It normally con-
sists of a formula based on indicators of performance. If in a given time
in the future the company's profits are as high as the founders expected,
they will be rewarded; conversely, if the business performs as the PE-VC
forecasted, the group will not have overpaid for its share in the company.
Another way to align interests between management and the company is
through management stock options, also often used by groups in the
United States.
Call options and put options can be a means of increasing the upside or
minimizing risks, respectively. For this very reason while PE-VCs like to
be granted calls and puts, they try to avoid giving them to founders. 79 A
call option for the PE-VC on the shares of the founder grants the PE-VC
the possibility to acquire more participation and eventually the control of
the company upon the payment of a pre-defined price. Conversely, a put
option for the PE-VC is usually used as an exit mechanism. The right to
exercise the option can be linked to a specific period, performance goal,
or other event.
78. LEVIN, supra note 4, at 2-14.
79. Sahlman, supra note 35, at 504.
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Rights of first offer and first refusal are other key clauses found in PE-
VC investment contracts. The success of a business is quite often linked
to the values of the founders and current management and the quality of
their performance. This belief leads PE-VCs to devote a significant
amount of time developing a relationship with management and to expect
that they remain in the company after the investment is made. Actually,
one of the worst nightmares for a PE-VC would be to witness the en-
trance of a new shareholder in the business without its consent. This
event would be even more frightening if the PE-VC is a minority share-
holder, because such a change would allow the control of the company to
fall into the hands of an unknown new partner who could change policies
and business plans. This situation can be easily avoided by a right of first
offer to the PE-VC. The utilization of this provision imposes an obliga-
tion on the founder to first notify the PE-VC of his or her interest to sell
his or her stock at a stated price. If the PE-VC does not acquire the
shares at that price, the founder is free to sell them to a third-party for a
price equal or higher to the one specified in the notification. But just the
right to a first offer may not suffice, and a sophisticated PE-VC will most
likely want to include the right of first refusal. This right grants the PE-
VC the ability to preempt a third-party buyer and purchase the founder's
stock for the price agreed between the founder and the third-party.80 Al-
though the PE-VC would rather overpay for the shares than have them
sold to a third-party, the case may be such that the PE-VC believes the
price asked is far from fair and that the founder will most likely not find
any party to buy the shares at the stated price. So it would be wise to
wait for a concrete proposal from a third-party and then simply purchase
the shares through the exercise of the right of first refusal.
B. CONTROL RIGHTS IN BRAZIL
A major concern of PE-VCs investing in developing countries is under-
standing the pitfalls of being a minority shareholder in a local company.
In other words, investors want to know what the chances are of facing
expropriation by managers and majority shareholders and not being able
to enforce their rights.81 Lerner and Schoar have identified that in devel-
oping countries with French legal origin like Brazil, PEs tend to have less
contractual protections and less efficient legal enforcement. 82 Conse-
quently, PEs try to protect their investment by guaranteeing their returns
through the ownership of the majority of the company's equity and by
requiring more board representation, 83 instead of relying on rights re-
lated to the protection of minority shareholders such as anti-dilution and
supermajority provisions.84 In these countries, ownership concentration
80. LEVIN, supra note 4, at 4-65.
81. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 15, at 1151.
82. Lerner & Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The
Contractual Channel in Private Equity, supra note 1, at 224-25.
83. Id. at 225.
84. Id. at 238.
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becomes a substitute for weak legal protection.85
Brazil is not known for providing quality enforcement. Indeed, most
practitioners interviewed do not believe Brazilian courts can properly an-
alyze and timely enforce complex contracts. Does this mean that the fi-
nancial contracting choices for low enforcement countries depicted above
apply to Brazil? In order to understand this, we investigate whether PE-
VCs would accept a minority ownership in Brazilian companies, and if so,
which contractual contingencies they rely on.
Regarding the first inquiry, 86 percent of the PE-VCs declared they
would accept a minority number of voting shares in the company if they
had veto power for certain corporate activities (see Table 4). Surpris-
ingly, just one PE stated that it would only invest in a Brazilian company
through full control. In this PE's view, a majority position is fundamental
given the local problems of enforcement, which subject minority share-
holders to long and costly delays. Although this opinion is shared by
other groups, the enforcement deficiencies found in Brazil do not prevent
them from accepting a minority position or even equally shared control.
Likewise are the findings of Carvalho et al. According to their survey,
28.5 percent of groups with operations in Brazil think that having control
of the invested firm is essential.86 Additionally, from a sampling of 325
reported deals, full control through the purchase of the majority of shares
was found only in 20 percent of the transactions.87
TABLE 4 - FORMS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTED
COMPANY ACCEPTABLE ACCORDING TO THE PE GROUP'S
POLICY FOR INVESTMENTS IN BRAZIL
# of funds %
Minority of shares with veto power 6 86%
Minority of shares with control 3 43%
Equally shared control 2 29%
Full control through the purchase of the majority of shares 2 29%
Total Funds Interviewed 7
For the PE-VCs that would accept holding a minority ownership, we
further questioned the frequency with which they used the following con-
tractual provisions: tag-along rights, anti-dilution provisions, put and call
structures, vesting provisions, right of first offer and right of first refusal,
and supermajority provisions. Table 5 shows that tag along, anti-dilution,
first offer and first refusal rights are ordinarily included in contracts exe-
cuted in Brazil. In fact, tag-along and anti-dilution rights are statutory
85. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 15, at 1145.
86. PE-VCs had to indicate if they agreed or not with the following statement: "For us
to invest, it is essential that we have the ability to acquire control." See
CARVALHO ET AL., supra note 3, at 60.
87. CARVALHO ET AL., supra note 3, at 60.
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rights provided by Law 6404.88
TABLE 5 - FREQUENCY WITH WHICH PE-VC GROUPS
INCLUDE PROVISIONS RELATED TO CONTROL RIGHTS IN
AGREEMENTS WITH BRAZILIAN COMPANIES
Total
PE-
Provisions Always Usually Often Sometimes Rarely Never VCs
100% 100%<70% 70%<50% 50%<15% 15%<0% 0%
Anti-dilution rights 4 1 1 0 0 1 7
57% 14% 14% 0% 0% 14%
Tag-along rights 7 0 0 0 0 0 7
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Drag-along rights 5 1 0 1 0 0 7
71% 14% 0% 14% 0% 0%
Put and call rights 1 1 2 2 0 1 7
14% 14% 29% 29% 0% 14%
Management stock 3 1 1 1 0 1 7
options
43% 14% 14% 14% 0% 14%
Earn-out formula 0 0 4 1 1 1 7
0% 0% 57% 14% 14% 14%
Vesting provision 2 4 0 0 1 7
29% 0% 57% 0% 0% 14%
Right of first refusal 7 0 0 0 0 0 7
100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Right of first offer 4 0 0 3 0 0 7
57% 0% 0% 43% 0% 0%
Finally, we asked PE-VCs about guarantees and remedies. The down-
side of the transactions are minimized by taking stocks of the founders
(penhor de aq6es) or receivables as a guarantee, or by leaving part of the
purchase price in an escrow account. In case of debt or convertible de-
bentures, the following provisions are adopted by some groups: (1) if the
company reaches certain milestones, there will be a decrease in interest
rates, (2) debt is backed by the founder (aval) or the company, or (3)
debt converts into equity if the firm defaults, with the exercise of this
provision left to the PE-VC's sole discretion.
Concerning remedies for the event of payment default or covenant
breach by the founder, PE-VCs cited the use of provisions such as the
right to take over board control, the right to increase dividends and/or
interest rates, the earlier exercise of the right of redeeming preferred
shares and/or debentures, and the issuance of warrants to purchase addi-
tional common stock at a low price.
88. Lei No. 6404/76 at arts. 171 and 254-A.
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All of these findings contradict the expected contracting choices for a
low enforcement environment. If practitioners do not believe in the en-
forcement efficiency of Brazilian courts, why have groups been increas-
ingly open to minority ownership structures? Many argued in the
interviews that the choice between a minority or majority ownership de-
pends mostly on the quality of the company and relationship with man-
agement. Also, given the lack of confidence in the enforceability of
contracts, the investment process, from screening to closing, is likely to
take longer in Brazil than in the United States. Thus, in Brazil it seems
PE-VCs need more time to conduct detailed due diligence and make ex-
tra effort to develop a solid relationship with founders and management.
Further, it could be argued that the confidence in the local environment
has been increasing with the maturity of the country's PE-VC industry.
As experience grows, PE-VCs have been able to better assess the real
risks of investing in Brazil. A final factor may be the emergence of arbi-
tration as an alternative dispute resolution method. As demonstrated in
the section below, arbitration has been broadly adopted by the PE-VC
industry.
V. THE IMPACT OF LEGAL ENFORCEMENT ON
FINANCIAL CONTRACTING
Legal protection of investors encompasses the content and enforceabil-
ity of laws. First, local law has to allow the use of complex contractual
structures. But the content alone is worthless if not accompanied by the
assurance of enforcement. 89 The quality of legal enforcement has been
measured through various methods. La Porta et al. created a "rule of law
index" based on investors' estimates of the law and order environment in
the countries where they had operations.90
Lerner and Schoar compared the time a contract dispute takes to be
resolved in the courts of various countries.9 1 Lerner and Schoar found
that the longer the period, the less likely a PE-VC group is to rely on
preferred stock. 92 Also, while in low legal enforcement countries, inves-
tors tend to seek control through the purchase of the majority of shares as
a substitute to contractual protection, in effective enforcement countries,
investors are likely to separate cash flow and control rights, and rely on
89. Nicola Gennaioli, Contracting in the Shadow of Law 1 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished
working paper, Stockholm University Institute for International Economic Stud-
ies), available at http://www.iics.su.se/-nicolacontract.pdf.
90. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 15, at 1138. They employed a scale
from zero to ten. A ten was awarded to the United States, Canada, and Australia;
Brazil got a 6.32, which was one of the highest marks among the developing
countries.
91. Lerner & Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The
Contractual Channel in Private Equity, supra note 1, at 234.
92. Id.
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contract contingencies. 93 As a practical result, in low enforcement coun-
tries, more capital has to be committed to one single investment, which
may be not desirable depending on the portfolio diversification strategy
of the investor.
In Brazil, a central concern of investors relates to the enforcement of
contractual structures in place. Practitioners point out the long and costly
process of going to court, the lack of case law, and judges' lack of knowl-
edge in the financial contracting area. Statistics confirm that a contract
dispute in a Brazilian court takes considerable time to be resolved; the
process of enforcement of a contract encompasses twenty-five procedures
and takes an average of 566 days-but it often takes several years. 94
Contrastingly, in high-income states of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development the process averages eighteen proce-
dures and 213 days. 95
Until recently, the fears of facing the Brazilian judicial system would
often lead foreign investors to adopt the law of New York, Delaware,
London, or another location perceived to have more efficient courts. But
since 1996, with the enactment of the Arbitration Act (Law 9307/96), ar-
bitration started to be seriously considered as an alternative to Brazilian
courts. Even greater support was given to this method in 2001 when the
Brazilian Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of the Arbitra-
tion Act.96
The interviews have identified a clear trend of including arbitration as
the dispute resolution method in shareholders agreements and stock-
purchase contracts between PE-VCs and Brazilian companies. From the
practitioners interviewed, only one has never included an arbitration
clause in his contracts. But even this group is now considering electing
arbitration in the following deals. Additionally, according to practition-
ers and lawyers in the PE-VC area, the coming agreements are very likely
to have an arbitration clause.
Perhaps as surprising as the broad acceptance of arbitration, is the fre-
quent use of Brazil-based arbitration courts in the agreements. Most PE-
VCs interviewed select local arbitration courts, notably the ones that be-
long to respected Brazilian institutions or to international chambers of
commerce. The first group includes Bolsa de Valores de Sao Paulo
93. Id. at 224. As remarked by Lerner and Schoar, this separation is achieved through
the use of securities that shift control depending on the performance of the in-
vested company.
94. BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATIONAL, BRAZIL BUSINESS FORECAST REPORT, Q3
28, 30 (2006). The data mentioned in the article was extracted from World Bank.
95. Id.
96. The constitutionality of the Arbitration Act was recognized in the process of ho-
mologation of an international arbitral award by the Brazilian Supreme Court
(Agravo Regimental n. 5206). See FEDERACAO NACIONAL DAS EMPRESAS DE
SEGUROS PRIVADOS E DE CAPITALIZACAO, ARBITRAGEM: SOLUCIONAR OS LI-
TIGiOS Ficou MAIS FACIL (2nd ed.), available at http://cbma.com.br/wp-content/
uploads/2006/08/Guia%20de %20Arbitragem %20da %20FENASEG.pdf#search=
%22stf%202001%20arbitragem%22 (last visited Aug. 28, 2006).
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(BOVESPA) (Sao Paulo's stock exchange) and the Federation of the In-
dustries of the State of Sao Paulo; the latter group includes the Chamber
of Commerce Brazil-Canada and the American Chamber of Commerce.
Even the interviewed U.S.-based group chooses a Brazil-based arbitra-
tion court. Other responses include the Paris-based court, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, and ad hoc arbitrators, such as investment
banks, consulting firms, or law firms. Concerning the law applied, all but
one PE 97 chooses to apply the Brazilian law.
The use of the arbitration clause in PE-VC investment contracts with
Brazilian companies is a clear adaptation to the local environment in Bra-
zil. Such provisions are not commonly found in stock-purchase or share-
holder agreements between the PE-VC and the invested company in the
United States. Likewise, Lerner and Schoar identified the use of arbitra-
tion clauses in some developing countries as a way of PE-VCs avoiding
court delays. 98
Despite the well-founded fears related to contract enforcement in Bra-
zil, only 1 of 112 transactions has had a contract under dispute in the
Brazilian courts. According to practitioners, controversies are usually re-
solved internally by the parties because PE-VCs strive not to bring a dis-
pute into courts. It remains to be seen whether arbitration will encourage
investors to exercise the dispute resolution provision more often instead
of seeking out-of-court agreements.
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL
FRAMEWORK RELEVANT TO PE-VC INVESTMENT
The main body of rules related to investment in Brazilian privately-
held companies are found in Law 6404/76 (the Corporation Act),99 Law
11101/05 (Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy Act), and in regula-
tions from Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM), the Brazilian
equivalent of the Securities Exchange Commission in the United States.
Focus is given to recent developments of the Brazilian laws that are rele-
vant to PE-VC funds, namely laws that may impact a fund's investment
and exit strategies.
A. CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The size of a country's capital market is central for PE-VC activity.
Because PE-VC investments are typically meant to last for a pre-deter-
mined period, 100 it is essential to analyze exit options prior to investing,
as well as the contractual design of detailed rules related to exit. There-
fore, although PE-VC funds focus on privately-held companies, the possi-
97. The fund that elects the International Chamber of Commerce chooses to apply the
Law of New York in case of dispute.
98. Lerner & Schoar, Transaction Structures in the Developing World: Evidence from
Private Equity, supra note 2, at 27.
99. Lei No. 6404 was substantially changed in 2001 by Lei No. 10303.
100. LEVIN, supra note 4, at 1-3.
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bility of exiting the business through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) may
be determinant for taking the investment decision.10 1 Not coincidentally,
the United States and the United Kingdom, which have the largest capital
markets in the world, also have the most active PE-VC industry and
house the largest PE-VC deals.102 Strong capital markets are character-
ized by a dispersed shareholder base,10 3 which in turn is fostered by
sound legislation protecting minority investors. Therefore, a well-devel-
oped legal system is the base for creating a virtual cycle of liquidity,
growth, and wealth.
But exiting the business is a traditional problem associated with invest-
ing in Brazilian companies. Until recently the only realistic exit alterna-
tive for a PE-VC would be a trade sale, i.e., sale to a strategic buyer.
IPOs were rare and public companies' ownership structure was extremely
concentrated. This picture was a reflection of the legal framework, which
was insufficient to protect minority investors and ensure good corporate
governance in public companies. In 2001 substantial changes were intro-
duced. First, Law 10303 brought significant corporate governance im-
provements to the then twenty-five year-old Law 6404, providing
minority shareholders with more protection, such as tag-along rights, 10 4
and with minimum requirements for preferred shares negotiated in the
securities markets.10 5 Second, also in 2001, BOVESPA-Brazil's largest
stock exchange and the ninth largest in the world-launched Novo Mer-
cado, internationally recognized for its high requirements of corporate
governance and accounting standards.10 6 The effect of these regulation
improvements can already be seen. Novo Mercado has been attracting a
record amount of new issuers and investors since 2004107 and now repre-
101. See Leslie A. Jeng & Philippe C. Wells, The Determinants of Venture Capital Fund-
ing: Evidence Across Countries, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 241, 242 (2000). The authors found
that IPOs are the strongest driver of VC investment, particularly for later-stage
investment.
102. In 2004, PE activity was worth US$ 60 and £ 24 in the United States and the
United Kingdom, respectively. See APAX PARTNERS, UNLOCKING GLOBAL
VALUE: FUTURE TRENDS IN PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT WORLDWIDE 11
(2006), available at http://www.apex.com/unlocking-global-value_-_future-trends-
in.private.equity.investment-worldwide.pdf.
103. Irina Shirinyan, The Perspective of U.S. Securities Disclosure and the Process of
Globalization, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 515, 518 (2004). In the United States
and the United Kingdom companies' shares are diluted among a broad base of
individual and institutional investors, creating a dispersed shareholder ownership
system. Conversely, continental Europe and Brazil are characterized as having
concentrated ownership systems.
104. The tag-along right is in article 254-A of Lei No. 6.404. The article establishes that
the price offered for stocks of minority shareholders cannot be over 20 percent
lower than the price offered for the controlling shareholders.
105. Article 17, paragraph 1, establishes minimum advantages for preferred shares
without voting rights or with restricted voting rights negotiated in the securities
market.
106. For further details on the Novo Mercado, see John C. Coffee Jr., Racing Towards
the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on Interna-
tional Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1806-08 (2002).
107. The number of IPOs in 2004, 2005, and 2006 were seven, nine, and twenty-six
respectively. In 2007, fifteen IPOs were launched until April 15th.
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sents a real exit possibility for PE-VC funds. 10 8 Out of forty-two IPOs
from 2004 to 2006, nineteen involved PE funds exiting the investment. 10 9
A latest effort by BOVESPA to increase the Brazilian capital markets'
size is called BOVESPA MAIS, launched at the end of 2005 and aimed at
mid-sized companies, which could be compared to London Stock Ex-
change's successful branch AIM.
B. BANKRUPTCY LAW
Bankruptcy legislation has substantially changed, now providing both
equity investors and financial debt creditors with more protection. Under
previous law, both equity and debt investors faced serious drawbacks.
Equity investors faced significant risk because liquidation was highly
likely for companies under the old reorganization rules (concordata);
companies did not have the necessary legal assistance or a sustainable
reorganization plan put in place to enable recovery from distress. And
the latter, debt investors, had very small chances of recovering their capi-
tal; secured creditors could not seize the company's assets for two years
(under concordata) 1 and were behind tax and labor credits in the liqui-
dation line.
Law 11101 of 2005 introduced the new bankruptcy and corporate reor-
ganization legislation, providing equity owners with real possibilities of
reorganizing the firm, and placing secured creditors in a more favorable
position in liquidation, now before tax credits and just behind a capped
amount of labor credits. The reorganization plan can be judicial or out-
of-court, and must be approved by the creditors.
Another innovation is the possibility to sell the bankrupt company
without transferring the succession of liabilities to the new owner. All
these changes are likely to give an impulse to funds focused on distressed
companies.
C. INVESTMENT VEHICLES
In 1994, CVM (Rule 209) created the Fundo Mutuo de Investimento
em Empresas Emergentes (FMIEE), the first national investment vehicle
for PE-VCs, which was an attempt to create a structure resembling the
U.S. Limited Partnerships. 1 ' There were some limitations to this vehicle
that led to the creation of the Fundos de Investimento em ParticipaqOes
108. See Stephen Grocer, Private Equity Firms May Flock to Invest in Latin America,
MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONs REPORT, May 9, 2005, at 3, 4.
109. CARVALHO ET AL., supra note 3, at 19 (brings information on the number of IPOs
in 2004 and 2005). See BOVESPA Encerra 2006 corn Destaques em Pontuaq~o,
Volume, Ntdmero de Neg6cios, Valor de Mercado, Home Broker e Ingresso de
Novas Empresas, 04 de Janeiro de 2007, available at http://home.furb.br/wilhelm/
HPMC arquivos/ANoticias.htm (last visited on April 18, 2007) (for information
on IPOs in 2006).
110. Mariz & Savoia, supra note 23, at 81.
111. Id. at 37.
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(FIPs) in 2004 by CVM Rule 391. Unlike the FMIEE, 12 FIPs impose no
limitation on the size of the invested company, and it explicitly allows
control of the invested companies through the purchase of the majority of
the stock or through a shareholder agreement.
The use of these vehicles by foreign investors is likely to grow with the
enactment of Law 11312 in June 2006. It eliminated the income tax lev-
ied on the earnings of foreign investors who invest in quotas of FMIEE
and FIPs and who are not residents in low income tax jurisdictions.1 13
D. PENSION FUNDS REGULATION
The government has also supported state pension fund investment in
private equity by amending regulations in 2002 and 2003 to increase allo-
cation of funds in alternative assets.114 Petrobras, BNDES, and Banco do
Brasil, the three largest pension funds in Brazil, invested around 1 per-
cent of their funds in PE-VCs in 2005, which represents approximately
$265 million. 115
E. ARBITRATION
Although a long existing method, the Arbitration Law was only en-
acted in 1996 by the Brazilian legislature, following the UNCITRAL
Model Law. As discussed above in section five, arbitration is likely to
become the preferred dispute resolution method for investors in the
country due to the lack of efficiency of the Brazilian courts.
Despite all these improvements towards increasing investor confi-
dence, 116 Brazil is still poorly positioned in recent rankings of institu-
tional environment for investments. For instance, the country comes in
twenty-ninth place in the Apax and Economist Intelligence Unit private
equity environment ranking. 117 Among the weakest points are Brazil's
judicial system and its corporate and indirect taxation system, considered
"excessively complex, porous and inefficient."1 1 8
112. Rule 209 limited investments to companies with less than $100 million of net
revenues.
113. For further details on the new taxation rules on earnings and capital gains of FIPs
and FMIEEs see Walter Stuber, Brazil: Taxation - Exemptions, J. INT'L BANKING
L. & REG. 21(6), 43-44 (2006). The author bases his comments on the Provisional
Measure 281, which was later converted into the Lei No. 11312.
114. Mariz & Savoia, supra note 23, at 80.
115. See APAX PARTNERS, supra note 102, at 23.
116. In this sense, Alvaro Gongalves, head of Brazil's VC and PE Association and exec-
utive director of Stratus Investimentos in Sdo Paulo, stated in an interview that the
new bankruptcy law and arbitration legislation are making investors more confi-
dent about doing business in Brazil. In his words, "[flive years ago, investors had
concerns about regulations and transparency that no longer exist." See Venture
Capital on the Upswing: Local Investors are Stepping up in Brazil to Fill Funding
Gaps Left After a Number of Foreign Funds Fled to Faster Growing Asian Markets,
175 LATIN FIN. 46, 47 (2006), available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/com2/
summary_0286-14292007_itm.
117. See APAX PARTNERS, supra note 102, at 23.
118. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
PE financing is characterized by separating the allocation of cash flow
and control rights. This means PE-VCs normally rely on contingencies to
exercise more or less cash flow, voting and board rights. Albeit demon-
strated that the optimal contracting structure may vary according to the
particularities of each transaction, the rights and contingencies associated
with convertible preferred stock and minority ownership are often the
best fit for the needs of PE-VC groups. For its large reliance on the con-
tractual channel, this structure would not suit investments in low enforce-
ment jurisdictions. Therefore, if a country's institutional environment is
poorly developed, PE-VCs will most likely require full control through
the purchase of the majority of common stocks to avoid risks of expropri-
ation and non-enforcement of contractual provisions.
The Brazilian corporate legislation for privately-held companies is flex-
ible enough to allow the design of financial contracts with a structure
similar to what is used in the United States and other developed coun-
tries. There are no relevant constraints on what the private parties can
contract. Brazilian legislation normally sets only minimum standards in
order to protect the minority investor, and to provide parties with free-
dom to contractually establish more protection. Even when legal or bu-
reaucratic constraints exist, often parties have the possibility to contract
around them, reaching the original objectives through other similar legal
structures.
Although common stocks seem to prevail in PE transactions in Brazil,
the employment of convertible securities is above the average found in
developing countries, and a large majority of the PE-VCs would accept a
minority ownership with veto power. These are positive indicators con-
sidering Brazil's condition as a developing civil law country. It is also
emphasized that PE groups should be aware of the potential undesired
results of transplantation of provisions, but apparently it seems this issue
has been considered. Contracts have included provisions directed specifi-
cally to the Brazilian environment, as is the case with arbitration
provisions.
Enforcement is most likely the main legal pitfall for PE investment in
Brazil. The perceived low quality of enforcement leads some funds to
require full control through majority ownership of common stocks and to
require longer periods of screening and due diligence. Before making the
investment decision, PE-VCs in Brazil are likely to dedicate more time,
not only to be better ensured of the quality of the company, but also to
develop a deeper relationship with founders and management. Addition-
ally, arbitration is emerging as the PE-VCs' preferred dispute resolution
method in an attempt to avoid the deficient local court system.
While economic and political factors are central for PE activity, the
legal environment also significantly impacts investment decisions. There-
fore, economic stability and sustained growth since 2003, combined with
the development of local capital markets, growth of PE experience in the
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country, institutionalization of arbitration, a decrease of taxation on PE
investment, and other improvements in the legal framework have fos-
tered investment growth and the increase in sophistication of financing
structures in Brazil.
